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PROPORTIONALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
WHY EVERYWHERE BUT HERE?
BERNHARD SCHLINK*
INTRODUCTION
Suppose you are a judge—not on a European constitutional court,
where the principle of proportionality is generally accepted, nor on the U.S.
Supreme Court, where, according to general wisdom, the principle is hardly
known and hardly used, but on a fictitious moral court. No statutes, no
precedent—each case is decided on its moral merits only. Two neighbors,
John and Frank, who live high up in the mountains come before you. In the
middle of a cold and stormy winter night, John took Frank’s four-wheel
drive car without asking and didn’t return it until the next evening. Frank
who had wanted to pick up his elderly mother in the morning at the lonely
bus station in the valley, couldn’t do so. The old lady stood in the cold for
two hours before the postman drove by; he had to bring her to the hospital
with frostbite. Frank thinks John should at least apologize for his immoral
action. John is truly sorry for what happened but thinks he shouldn’t be
morally blamed. You are the judge—what will you do?
You ask John how he could do what he did. He explains that he took
Frank’s car to bring his pregnant wife to the hospital; her water had broken.
You ask why he didn’t use his own car. He explains that he needed a fourwheel drive car because it had snowed heavily. You ask why he took the
car without asking. He points out that he and Frank had often taken and
used each other’s things without asking and that he hadn’t wanted to wake
Frank up in the middle of the night.
Then you turn to Frank. In view of what John has explained, does he
still blame John for his immoral action? Frank does, because he had told
John of his plan to pick up his mother the next morning. You confront John
with this information. He says he is sorry for the old lady’s frostbite but
that he knew that with the postman driving by nothing serious could
happen to her, while his wife’s situation was a matter of life and death. You
call the hospital, and it turns out that indeed John’s wife, who delivered
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unexpectedly early, could have died if she hadn’t reached the hospital when
she did. And it also turns out that Frank’s mother has recovered well and
fast.
Whatever you decide, maybe that John and Frank should reconcile
because what happened was a chain of unfortunate events, you have
engaged in a proportionality analysis. You asked Frank about the end that
he pursued; you found out that the end was legitimate; that his action was a
helpful, even a necessary means to pursue the end; that there was no
alternative means that would have harmed Frank and his mother less; and
that the end, saving John’s wife’s life, was important enough to justify the
harm done to Frank’s mother. Proportionality analysis is about means and
ends, and whenever there is no law, here no moral law, specifically
commanding, prohibiting, or allowing an action, we justify or condemn the
action based on the legitimacy of the end pursued and on the helpfulness,
necessity, and appropriateness of the action as a means to that end.
The proportionality principle thus reads as follows: If you pursue an
end, you must use a means that is helpful, necessary, and appropriate. A
means that doesn’t help to reach the end isn’t a real means—to use it would
be out of proportion. It is also out of proportion to use a means that does
more than necessary, for example a means which is more harmful or more
expensive than necessary. It is equally out of proportion to use a means that
is inappropriate because, even though it is necessary, by using it you do
more harm than the end is worth or you spend more than you gain. It would
have been out of proportion and, in our context, immoral if John had taken
Frank’s helicopter, when, even though he knew how to fly it, he didn’t
have the skill to land; this would not have helped him to save his wife. It
would have been out of proportion and immoral for John to take Frank’s
four-wheel drive car if John’s normal car would have worked just as well;
this would have been unnecessary to save his wife. And to take Frank’s
four-wheel drive car would have been out of proportion and immoral if not
the life of John’s wife but the life of Frank’s mother would have been in
serious danger; the action would have done more harm to Frank’s mother
than good to John’s wife.
In short: enough is enough and more is too much. More than enough is
out of proportion, more than necessary is out of proportion, more than
appropriate is out of proportion. So don’t do more!
I. PROPORTIONALITY AND BALANCING
In law the principle of proportionality arises in those cases where
specific norms commanding or prohibiting specific means or, to be more
precise, actions that serve people as means, are lacking. The right of self-
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defense is one example. Everyone is entitled to defend his or her life,
liberty, and property. To pursue this end he or she is entitled to use means
that would otherwise be prohibited and may thus cheat and strike and
shoot. No action that might become helpful and necessary for one’s selfdefense is prohibited categorically. But the law doesn’t go so far as to
allow one to act any way one wants. Unable to deal with the abundance of
self-defense situations more specifically, it requires proportionate selfdefense.
Let’s assume there is a lame man who sits on his porch and sees a
child climbing into his apple tree and picking apple after apple. He shouts,
but the child just laughs. His only means to drive the child off the apple
tree is to use a gun that he can reach and to shoot the child down. The
means of shooting the child is helpful and it is even necessary to reach the
end of defending his property. But we easily agree that it is inappropriate or
imbalanced: The life of the child is much more precious than the value of a
couple of apples.
Here the balancing of the the property to be saved against the life to be
sacrificed appears as the last step of proportionality analysis. That is often
the case. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, for example,
reviewed whether the state could extract a defendant’s cerebrospinal fluid
in order to determine his mental capacity. It decided that determining
mental capacity was a legitimate goal and that the extraction was helpful
and necessary. However, the court recognized that since the extraction is
painful and dangerous, the state can require an extraction to resolve only a
serious crime. Only then are the pain and danger of the extraction and the
resolution of the crime properly balanced.1
But sometimes balancing also appears as the framework for
proportionality analysis. The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, in
reviewing the use of deadly force against fleeing felons, balanced the
state’s interest in preventing the escape of a criminal with the individual’s
interest in preserving his or her life. To find the proper balance, the Court
engaged in a means-end analysis that had the characteristics of
proportionality analysis even though the court didn’t name it that. The
court focused on the use of force against fleeing felons as a means and on
the mean’s end. The end is to protect citizens; therefore, deadly force is
necessary against a fleeing felon only if he or she poses a serious physical
threat to a citizen. Only in these situations does the court regard the use of
deadly force to be properly balanced.2
1. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 10, 1963, 16
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 194.
2. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 27 (1985).
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In jurisprudence as well as in legal literature, we find balancing used
both as the last step of proportionality analysis and as the framework for
proportionality analysis. This can be confusing. But it only means that, as
happens often, one and the same problem can be tackled from different
angles.
II. PROPORTIONALITY IN GERMANY
In Germany the principle of proportionality came into its own not in
criminal law or law enforcement but in administrative law, when the police
act to protect the public.3 From the late eighteenth to the early twentieth
century, the relevant norm provided little more than a definition of the task
of the police: The police had to do what was necessary to fight dangers to
public safety and order.4 The norm was meant to give the police wide
discretion in fighting dangerous behavior of all sorts, from offending the
Prussian king at a Socialist rally to building a house without proper
structural engineering or running a chemical plant without proper waste
disposal. In the beginning the norm even meant to give the police
uncontrolled discretion. But once the ideas of individual rights and the
Rechtsstaat (the state under the rule of law) began to prevail, the courts
started to institute controls over the police. The days of uncontrolled
discretion were over. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the
Prussian High Administrative Court developed this norm, a norm that did
no more than define the task of the police, into a jurisprudence of
proportionality. The police were entitled to use only means that were fit,
necessary, and appropriate or, as it was also called, proportional in the
narrow sense as opposed to proportional in the wide sense, meaning fit,
necessary and appropriate. The means had to work, there had to be no other
means that would be equally effective but less intrusive, and the end had to
be important enough to justify the intrusion.
The court had only two normative premises. First, the police were
entitled to do what was necessary to fight dangers to public safety and
order. Second, citizens’ life, liberty, and property were protected against
police intrusion. Together the two premises created a dilemma. It is
impossible to fight dangers without intruding into citizens’ life, liberty, and
property. So how could the police fight dangers, necessarily resulting in
some intrusion, and at the same time protect citizens against intrusion? The
court resolved the dilemma by allowing the police to intrude, but not in an
3. See BODO PIEROTH, BERNHARD SCHLINK & MICHAEL KNIESEL, POLIZEI- UND
ORDNUNGSRECHT MIT VERSAMMLUNGSRECHT 4-13 (6th ed. 2010).
4. ALLGEMEINES LANDRECHT FÜR DIE PREUSSISCHEN STAATEN [ALR], Feb. 5, 1794, Part II,
Title 17, § 10.
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arbitrary way, and by defining the nonarbitrary way as the proportional
way.
In the second half of the twentieth century, the German Federal
Constitutional Court found itself with two very similar premises and not
much more.5 The German constitution contains a bill of rights that grants
individuals a wide variety of rights and freedoms. At the same time, the
constitution empowers the legislature to limit these rights and freedoms and
intrude upon them. Here again is the dilemma of how to reconcile these
conflicting provisions. The constitution’s grant of rights cannot mean that
the rights always trump the legislature’s power. Nor can the constitution’s
empowering the legislature mean that the citizens’ rights are meaningless.
The provisions have to coexist, and again, together they can mean only that
the legislature is empowered to limit and intrude, but not in an arbitrary
way. And again, the court defined and still defines this nonarbitrary way as
the way under the principle of proportionality: The laws that the legislature
enacts in pursuing its ends must be proportional.
What other definition of the nonarbitrary way could the court have
devised? Once there is significant, but not total empowerment to achieve an
end and to use means to achieve the end, the only way to curtail and control
the empowerment is to require the means to be proportional.
Let me give you a few examples. The German constitution protects
individuals’ freedom to choose and to practice a profession. At the same
time, it empowers the legislature to limit this freedom. To safeguard
patients’ health, the legislature instituted all kinds of controls on
pharmaceutical sales, among them a limitation on the number of
pharmacies that can be opened in each district. This was invalidated by the
Federal Constitutional Court as an unnecessary intrusion into professional
freedom that was out of proportion; the legislature could and should have
achieved its goals by instituting regulations on the storing and sales of
pharmaceuticals.6 The German constitution also protects freedom of
assembly and at the same time empowers the legislature to limit it. The
statutory requirement to seek police permission for a public demonstration
would go too far and would be out of proportion; notifying the police of the
public demonstration is enough to allow it to make sure that the public
demonstration doesn’t clash with general traffic.7 The free use of property,
5. See generally Bernhard Schlink, Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit, in 2 FESTSCHRIFT
50 JAHRE BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 445 (Peter Badura & Horst Dreier eds., 2001).
6. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 11, 1958, 7
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 377.
7. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 14, 1985, 69
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 315.
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while constitutionally protected, can be limited by statute, among others by
landmark statutes. A landmark regulation that requires an owner to keep up
his house even though it has become unusable to him is out of proportion
and unconstitutional; if the state wants to landmark the house it has to
expropriate and compensate the owner.8
III. PROPORTIONALITY WORLDWIDE
In comparative constitutional law, the principle of proportionality is
often traced back to German roots.9 Indeed, in the second half of the
twentieth century, it was after the German Federal Constitutional Court
used the principle already, that constitutional courts from most European
countries as well as Israel, Canada, and South Africa, made the principle of
proportionality the cornerstone of their rights’ and freedoms’
jurisprudence.10 But there is nothing inherently German about the roots of
the principle of proportionality, nor is the introduction of the principle into
other constitutional contexts a transfer of a German principle. It is a
response to a universal legal problem. Once it is understood that an
authority’s reach is extensive but also limited, without the limits being
specified, the principle of proportionality serves as an instrument for
reconciling both: the extensive reach with the unspecified limits.
Therefore the universal legal problem and the principle of
proportionality as a response to that problem are not restricted to conflicts
of state versus citizen and citizen versus citizen. When state agencies have
conflicting powers, that are not clearly defined in their reach and limits,
and the fiat of a higher authority cannot resolve the conflict, then a court
must resolve the conflict, and the principle of proportionality can again
come into play. The U.S. Supreme Court relied on the principle of
proportionality, perhaps for the first time, in its jurisprudence on the

8. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG][Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 2, 1999, 100
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 226.
9. Aharon Barak, Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 369, 370
(2007); Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, American Balancing and German Proportionality: The
Historical Origins, 8 ICON 263, 271 (2010); Christoph Knill & Florian Becker, Divergenz trotz
Diffusion? Rechtsvergleichende Aspekte des Verhaeltnismässigkeitsprinzips in Deutschland,
Grossbritannien und der Europäischen Union, 36 Die Verwaltung 447, 454 (2003); Alec Stone Sweet
and Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 72, 74, 97 (2008) [hereinafter Stone Sweet & Mathews, The Hidden Foreign Law Debate in Heller].
10. See Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, The Hidden Foreign Law Debate in Heller: The
Proportionality Approach in American Constitutional Law, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 367, 379-80 (2009)
(offering detailed references); Stone Sweet & Mathews, The Hidden Foreign Law Debate in Heller,
supra note 9, at 74, 112.
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relation between the federal government and the states under the Dormant
Commerce Clause.11
But the principle comes into play primarily in conflicts over
fundamental rights and freedoms and the legislature’s power to limit and
intrude upon them. Here courts find themselves with the two premises and
not much more: the first that rights and freedoms are protected against
limitations and intrusions; the second that these rights and freedoms can be
limited and intruded upon. Here the answer must be that the limitations and
intrusions must not be arbitrary, but proportional.
But rights can also be granted in a different way. The Bill of Rights of
the American Constitution protects fewer rights than other constitutions but
protects the most prominent among them categorically. The free exercise of
religion must not be prohibited; freedom of speech, freedom of the press,
the right to assemble peaceably must not be abridged. The legislature is not
empowered to limit these rights or to intrude upon them. This doesn’t mean
that the rights don’t conflict with goals that the state pursues or with rights
of other citizens. But without a caveat for legislative limitations and
intrusions, demarcations and categorizations help resolve such conflicts.
The jurisprudence draws lines: The exercise of religion may be curtailed
where a religion-neutral law, as opposed to a religion-specific law, states its
commands or prohibitions. Speech is not protected when it turns into a
fight or commercial action or, as obscenity or defamation, lacks the value
of speech. It may also be restricted where the restrictions are not contentspecific, but content-neutral, and refer only to the time, place, and manner
of what is said.
But all of this doesn’t mean that proportionality analysis doesn’t come
into play in the U.S. Whenever American courts review limitations and
intrusions with strict scrutiny or a middle tier of scrutiny, or even with a
requirement of mere rationality, theirs is a means-end analysis that is a
more-or-less thorough proportionality analysis.12 The often-mentioned,
praised or criticized American exceptionalism exists. What this means in
our context is that the word “proportionality” appears only rarely; that the
means-end analysis is somewhat haphazard; and that balancing and means11. See Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights Review
and the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 814-24 (2011) [hereinafter Mathews & Stone
Sweet, All Things in Proportion?]; J. H. Mathis, Balancing and Proportionality in US Commerce
Clause Cases, 35 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 273, 273-75 (2008).
12. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constituitonal Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943,
963 (1987); Vicky C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening up
the Conversation on "Proportionality,” Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583, 602;
Mathews & Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion?, supra note 11, at 824-33; DAVOR ŠUŠNJAR,
PROPORTIONALITY, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, AND BALANCE OF POWERS 146 (2010).
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end analysis come systematically later. The first approach is to fine-tune
the realm of the right, to specify its inner limitations before allowing for
outer limitations by the legislature. Justice Breyer, who advocates
proportionality analysis for American constitutional law, is right:
Proportionality analysis would not be something alien to American
constitutional jurisprudence and scholarship; it would sharpen the
American methods of balancing, scrutinizing, and rationalizing.13 But I
understand that American courts and legal practitioners, like courts and
legal practitioners everywhere, are not too interested in seeing their
methods of legal reasoning sharpened and thereby their discretion
restricted.
With the exception of the American constitution, most modern
constitutions protect not just a few rights, but a plethora of rights and
freedom, with the effect that all behavior, all action, and all expression is
protected, but the state can limit and intrude upon these protections, as long
as it does so proportionally. Sometimes these constitutions were the
response to a previous totalitarian or dictatorial regime; lack of freedom in
all areas of life subsequently leads to an emphasis on the protection of
freedom in all areas of life as well. But even without the experience of
totalitarianism or dictatorship, in a world ever-more crowded and ever
narrower, freedom in all areas of life is ever-more valuable. With the farreaching constitutional protection of rights and freedoms, in the last
decades of the last century the principle of proportionality spread around
the world. In European countries lacking constitutionally protected rights
and freedoms or constitutional review, implementation of the European
Convention on Human Rights into the national legal system leads also to
implementation of the principle of proportionality into the national
jurisprudence.14 The European Court of Justice, the European Court of
Human Rights, and the Panels and the Appellate Body of the World Trade
Organization all operate under the principle of proportionality.15

13. See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW, 159-71 (2010)
14. See Jeffrey Jowell, Beyond the Rule of Law: Towards Constitutional Judicial Review, 2000
PUB. L. 671, 678-79 (offering detailed references for the United Kingdom).
15. See Knill & Becker, supra note 9, at 463 (offering detailed references); see generally Stone
Sweet & Mathews, The Hidden Foreign Law Debate in Heller, supra note 9, at 138-59. On the use of
the principle of proportionality by the tribunals of the International Center for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes see generally Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New
Frontier, 4 LAW & ETHICS OF HUM. RTS. 47 (2010).
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IV. PROBLEMS OF PROPORTIONALITY
It may sound as if I mean to say that proportionality works as the
solution for conflicts between the legislature and the citizenry—
everywhere and potentially even here in the U.S. But proportionality is also
the problem. Or, to be more precise, it is a structure within which all kinds
of problems unfold.
The first is the problem of insufficient or ambiguous information. It is
sometimes simply impossible to determine whether a means works and
whether it is necessary. The fitness and the necessity of a means is an
empirical problem, and often science, scholarship, and experience can help
in solving it. But often all one has are assumptions, contradictory
experiences, and as many expert opinions as there are interests involved.
Climate change is an example. Beyond a basic agreement that climate
change is dangerous and has to be countered, information about the extent
of the dangers and the effectiveness of the countermeasures is ambiguous
and insufficient.
The second big problem is that while, at least ideally, it is objectively
possible to determine whether a means works and is necessary, the
balancing of rights, interests, and values entailed in the analysis of
appropriateness is unavoidably subjective. There is no objective standard
for measuring and weighing free speech vs. privacy, freedom vs. safety,
privacy vs. public health, or the protection of an endangered species vs. the
creation of badly needed jobs.
There are several ways to deal with these two problems. To solve the
problem of insufficient or ambiguous information, one can establish a
burden-of-proof rule under which it is either the legislature or the affected
citizen who has to prove that the means at issue works or doesn’t work, is
necessary or is not necessary. Let’s assume that to protect the climate, the
legislature enacts a statute that requires car makers to use very
sophisticated and expensive exhaust filters, and let’s further assume that the
effect of the filters is dubious. If the legislature is entitled to limit the
citizens’ freedom only if it can prove that the statute helps to pursue the
legitimate end, in this case that the filter actually helps to protect the
climate, then the statute is unconstitutional. If, on the other hand, the
affected citizens have to prove that the statute does not help, then the
legislature enjoys the benefit of the doubt and the statute is constitutional.
No country’s constitutional jurisprudence, that I am aware of, follows
either of these two burden-of-proof rules. They all find flexible solutions in
between. They make the burden of proof shift depending on what is at
stake. If the citizen’s freedom that is to be limited is regarded as crucial for
the citizen’s autonomy, and if the end that the legislature pursues is
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regarded to be of minor importance for the common good, then some
constitutional courts require that the legislature demonstrate the
effectiveness and necessity of the statute beyond reasonable doubt. If, on
the other hand, the end that the legislature pursues is regarded to be
important, and if the freedom that is to be limited is regarded to be of minor
relevance, then the courts are more generous toward the legislature and
allow it to act, even if many questions about the effectiveness and necessity
of the statute remain unanswered. Of course there are many ways in which
the burden of proof can shift or even be shared by the court itself; there are
many degrees of scrutiny; many different notions of what is reasonable and
what is unreasonable doubt; many different ideas about what is crucial or at
least relevant for the citizen’s autonomy; and of what is important for the
common good. So it comes as no surprise that different traditions exist
regarding how to distribute the burden of proof between the legislature and
the citizens.16
Different traditions also exist regarding the second problem
mentioned: the problem of the unavoidable subjectivity of balancing, the
other element of proportionality.17 One position, taken by the Supreme
Court of Canada and also by constitutional scholars around the world, is
that there is no reason why justices should put their own subjectivity before
the subjectivity of the legislature. When decisions about how to pursue the
common good are subjective, then they are political. They need democratic
legitimization, and the legislature is democratically legitimized to make
them. Only when decisions can be made on objective grounds are experts
legitimized to make them. The contrary position, taken most often by other
courts and their judges, is that they, the legal experts on the constitutional
or supreme courts, because they are appointed by the president or
parliament, enjoy at least an indirect democratic legitimacy and
furthermore have the wisdom and time to balance more calmly and
carefully the crucial conflicts of a society than the legislature, which acts in
the turbulence and heat of political battle. And, again, there are many
positions in between. Most courts claim the right to control the balancing of

16. See ŠUŠNJAR, supra note 12, at 83-162 (discussing similarities and differences between the
jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court, the US Supreme Court, the European
Council of Human Rights, and the European Court of Justice); Dieter Grimm, Proportionality in
Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 383, 390 (2007) (noting the
different traditions of the German Federal Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Canada);
Mathews and Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion?, supra note 11, at 813-36 (explaining shifts in the
jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court); Julian Rivers, Proportionality and Variable Intensity of
Review, 65 CAMBRIDGE L. REV. 174 (2006) (discussing the jurisprudence of British courts); AHARON
BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 226-40 (2006) (expounding on the Israeli experience).
17. Cf. sources cited supra note 16.
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the legislature and replace it by their own balancing and at the same time
emphasize their respect for the results of the democratic political process.
This means that they interfere not always, but only on those occasions
when they feel a specific urge to do so. Naturally, some courts feel this
urge on more occasions than others.
One factor in determining both how the burden of proof is distributed
between the legislature and the citizens and how activist the courts are
when balancing becomes the issue, is the democratic and revolutionary
tradition. In France, with its double tradition of a powerful state and a
powerful belief in democracy—a belief that, since the French Revolution,
brought forth almost as many revolutions and constitutions as there were
generations—the people trust the political process and accept only a rather
weak judicial control of the legislature. In Germany where, in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the bourgeoisie was too weak to make
a revolution and instead invented administrative courts for the protection of
the citizens’ freedom and property, courts and the law enjoy more trust than
the legislature and politics. Germany is also among those countries where
the democratic political process led to fascism or communism. These
countries share a particular hope that a wise and strong constitutional or
supreme court will tame whatever dangerous tendencies the political and
legislative process may have.
Another important factor for the distribution of the burden of proof
and also for the assignment of the task of balancing is the homogeneity or
heterogeneity of the people. The more ethnic and religious conflicts there
are, the more it makes sense to shift some of the burden of integration from
politics to law and from the legislature to the constitutional or supreme
court. Canada and South Africa are accordingly countries with activist
courts. It also doesn’t come as a surprise that in Israel, where legitimacy as
a Jewish state and legitimacy as a democratic state are not in full harmony,
the court tries to establish its own legitimacy beyond and independent of
politics.
Taking into account all these different shapes and showing all these
different facets, does the principle of proportionality still have the
distinctive features that allow us to call it a principle? I don’t hesitate to say
yes. The principle of proportionality is not a simple principle, easily
applied and easily yielding answers. It is a complex principle, allowing for
different interpretations and modifications. But it structures our reasoning
and guides us on our difficult path to find answers.
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CONCLUSION
The principle of proportionality has had a fantastic career: from a
principle of moral philosophy to a legal principle, from a principle of
administrative law to a principle of constitutional law. It has been called the
ultimate rule of law,18 and even though there is no such thing as an ultimate
rule of law, the principle of proportionality is definitely a rule at which all
courts ultimately arrive. Even the U.S. Supreme Court, shy about using the
term, when it engages in means-end-analysis, follows the rule in substance
again and again.
Application of the principle has had and will continue to have a
standardizing effect on different constitutional cultures. Constitutional
cultures with a doctrinal tradition will progressively be transformed in the
direction of a culture of case law. The often-praised asset of proportionality
analysis is its flexibility; from case to case, facts may be assessed
differently and rights and interests weighed and balanced differently. The
case-specific configuration of facts, interests and rights becomes more
important and more significant than the doctrine that surrounds the case.
Judges become more interested in finding the proportional solution for the
case than in a decision that fits into established doctrine or helps to modify
and refine it. On the other hand, the principle of proportionality has a
certain structuring quality and potency that introduces a minimal doctrinal
element into constitutional cultures with a case-law tradition.
Another way of viewing this is to say that the principle of
proportionality doesn’t have a standardizing effect on different
constitutional cultures, but rather that it is a standard that constitutional
cultures share and that they become more and more aware of over time. It
is part of a deep structure of constitutional grammar that forms the basis of
all different constitutional languages and cultures. It comes to the surface
sooner or later—everywhere and even here.

18. See DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW (2004).

